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Four Stages In Assessing  Liberal Neutrality 
François Côté‐Vaillancourt* 
Abstract 
La notion de neutralité, bien que référent central au sein d’un État libéral, est 
souvent invoquée de manière imprécise et contradictoire dans le discours public. 
Proposant que cela résulte en partie des limites inhérentes à une compréhension 
abstraite et uniforme de ce concept, le présent article exposera comment l’idéal de 
neutralité libérale doit plutôt s’inscrire et s’évaluer par le biais de quatre étapes 
successives. Les quatre étapes en question dépassent la simple herméneutique 
philosophique du libéralisme en trouvant déjà des assises dans le droit ; elles seront 
dès lors illustrées tout au long du texte à l’aide des décisions pertinentes de la Cour 
Suprême du Canada. 
1. Philosophical overview 
1.1 An untenable principle? 
A common critique of the idea of neutrality as put forward in 
liberalism is that neither collective norms nor public policies can be 
truly neutral in their origins or their effects. After all, one cannot find 
any institution that would survive the test of absolute neutrality, as 
any rule at the very least discriminates against the criminal who 
breaks it. Thus, were not all criminals’ life choices conveniently 
omitted when we devised our institutions? Therefore, even before 
______________ 
* The author is a PhD student in philosophy (Université Catholique de 
Louvain). My thanks to Jocelyn Maclure for his comments and suggestions, 
and to all the participants of the 2011 Lovanium Seminar in Ethics and Public 
Policy. 
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pointing out the fact that our institutions were largely devised by rich 
white Christian men, as many philosophers and legal thinkers set out 
to demonstrate in the last decades, neutrality seems untenable as a 
principle. 
But there are good reasons to believe that this involves a “straw 
man” argument, as the idea of neutrality was never intended to have 
such an absolute and metaphysical interpretation. Nonetheless, 
attempts to encompass everything we associate with this principle in 
simple phrases such as “neutrality of intentions, not neutrality of 
effects” are not too successful in convincing the critics. Indeed, while 
such definitions can, in many cases, provide adequate guidelines for 
action, it is hard not to view them as incomplete. Sometimes, it just 
feels like we must look even at the unintentional results of a norm in 
order to avoid blatant injustice. Furthermore, when the legitimacy of 
the liberal framework as a whole is questioned, these general slogans 
are not sufficient and we need to broaden their philosophical scope.  
In this paper, after a brief philosophical overview, I intend to 
depart from the usual abstract lines of reasoning in order to describe 
how liberal neutrality can be reasonably orchestrated in our societies. 
More specifically, I will demonstrate that satisfactory liberal neutrality 
can be assessed in four practical “stages” of inquiry. Despite the last 
two being recent and still disputed, I will argue that taking account of 
these four stages instead of repeating some monolithic definition of 
neutrality is essential, as each of these stages is meant to tackle the 
complex problem of the excessive and unequally shared burden of 
collective decisions and social practices on individuals in a different 
ways. Therefore, the scope I adopt envisions the idea of neutrality as 
reaching far beyond the state ; hence the appellation “liberal 
neutrality” in place of the more common “neutrality of the state”. 
The decision to refer to the different aspects of that project as 
“stages” instead of “ways” is not benign either, as the inquiries and 
actions they imply are best understood in a logical succession1. 
To illustrate this understanding of the project of liberal neutrality, 
I will rely on a number of decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
______________ 
1 It is important to stress that “stages” should in no way be interpreted 
through a historical or deterministic conception in which a given society 
would be in the fourth stage while another would be in the first. The stages 
are steps in a normative inquiry, not categories in a sociological portrayal. 
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This way, I hope to clearly show what sort of complex yet limited 
neutrality is sought by liberals there and elsewhere, and also through 
which processes it can be attained in practical dilemmas. In a few 
words, the four stages proposed are : (1) The rejection of norms 
creating unequal burdens without a relevant goal ; (2) the complex 
appraisal of the legitimacy of a norm when a relevant goal is present ; 
(3) the choice not to change a norm or practice, but rather to 
compensate its effects at another level ; (4) the idea that, when a 
discriminatory rule is recognized as necessary and if the method of 
the third stage cannot apply, it is then possible to alter its general 
application for some individuals in some specific case. 
1.2 The difference between ends and means 
In 2007, amongst public unrest around the notion of “reasonable 
accommodation”, the government of the province of Quebec 
launched a public commission to monitor the situation and make 
recommendations. During its inquiries, it became necessary to better 
define the notion of “neutrality of the state”, which was invoked, 
along with “secularism”, both to protect religious differences and to 
forbid religious expressions. While working on this matter, the 
commission came out with the idea that two elements (the neutrality 
of the state and the separation of church and state) were best 
described as institutional means leading to the accomplishment of 
their real purpose (the values of equality and autonomy). However, 
given its public nature, it had to concede that it was also possible to 
see the two means as ends in themselves, as is common in the French 
model of republican laïcité :  
We can essentially envisage it as a relationship between 
aims and means, while recognizing that the means here are 
indispensable, or we can consider these four facets, both 
neutrality and separation and the two purposes, as values 
in themselves. This is a philosophical difference that we do 
not have to settle here. The fact remains that, considered 
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in either manner, the four principles can come into conflict 
and engender dilemmas that must be resolved2. 
Nonetheless, in the minds of two of the commission’s expert 
consultants, Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure, it was already clear 
which option was the best one. In their own book, Maclure and 
Taylor revealed their true colors by saying that neutrality of the state 
has to be seen as only a mean to the values it brings. They went on in 
characterizing the other option, associated with French public 
culture, as a historically understandable yet deplorable “fetishism of 
the means” (fétichisme des moyens)3. Therefore, when one is to tackle a 
question such as the wearing of religious symbols by public officials, 
it makes no sense to come to a complete interdiction in the name of 
absolute neutrality. On the contrary, the correct inquiry would be to 
check the balance between ends such as the free expression of the 
official’s religious convictions and the public’s trust that the 
institution is not biased against them. To be sure, a vast number of 
officials should be allowed to express their convictions because they 
are not, in any way, infringing on the capacity of others to trust them 
or to equally follow their convictions. 
This idea that neutrality matters only through the effects it brings 
is not a novel idea. The most compelling justifications for neutrality 
usually involve the modern and liberal desire to reasonably allow 
every individual to pursue his own conception of what is a good life, 
coupled with the observation that collective decisions and actions are 
the sources of many breaches in this ideal. If we believe a just order is 
one in which individuals can reasonably follow their own paths, then 
neutrality matters. In an excellent overview of neutrality, Roberto 
Merrill points out that in addition to this moral justification, one can 
also find epistemological (we cannot know what a good life is for 
sure) and pragmatist (whatever morality entails, non-neutral norms 
create conflicts) reasons4.  
______________ 
2 Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to 
Cultural Differences. (2008), Final Report, p. 137. 
3 Cf. Maclure, J. and C. Taylor (2010), Laïcité et liberté de conscience. 
4 Cf. Merrill, R. (2007), “Neutralité politique”. All these justifications are not 
mutually exclusive, in fact they reinforce each others, but I will stick to the 
moral one in this paper. 
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Liberalism is therefore a limited but far-reaching project in terms 
of neutrality, as its underlying concern, while non-absolute, 
nevertheless goes beyond the direct activities of the state to affect 
many social practices. Indeed, a vast number of implicit or explicit 
norms and practices exist outside of the State. Amongst these, many 
are not neutral because they favour or penalize some life choices or 
some people’s capacity to follow theirs. If we care about equality, this 
is a problem. However, this is not enough to state that these norms 
and practices must all be modified or eliminated. This is, of course, 
because many of them are meant to fill legitimate collective roles and 
have no reasonable or concrete alternatives that would also do better 
in terms of neutrality.This understanding of neutrality might surprise 
many philosophers who have accepted the mantra that neutrality is 
for the state and not for society. Was I just saying that this is not the 
case? Well, yes and no. On one hand, I believe that general and 
absolute rules like “neutrality is solely for the state’s institutions” are 
guidelines that should be overlooked if we find strong reasons to do 
so, since a good reason can defeat another depending on the 
context5. On the other hand, I recognize that we nevertheless have 
such strong reasons in favour of differentiating between the duty of 
neutrality in the basic institutions, the duty of a widespread and 
mandatory social practice and the duty of a voluntary association6. If 
this paper brings the notion of neutrality beyond the strict limits of 
state action, it is because the ideals of equality and freedom to pursue 
one’s conception of a good life cannot suddenly vanish when we go 
from a state norm to a social norm. In fact, this rejection of the 
dogma of neutrality limited to the state is not without precedents. As 
we will see, the Supreme Court’s decisions mentioned in the 
following pages will come from a variety of contexts : state laws, 
______________ 
5 This understanding of morality is sometimes called weak contextualism. It 
should not be confused with consequentialism, as the reasons involved in a 
contextual inquiry may be deontological in nature and are not limited to the 
maximisation of a given good, as in utilitarianism. Since the thesis of value 
pluralism may explain this importance of the context, the next section 
should make things clearer. 
6 For example, I see a lot of wisdom in Rawls’s focus on the basic structure 
as the prime subject for an ambitious program of justice ; see Rawls, J. 
(1971), A Theory of Justice. 
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private contracts, school board decisions, corporation practices, etc. 
But, of course, stating that breaches in neutrality outside the state 
institutions matter does not entail a verdict in favour of applying 
identical measures of neutrality everywhere and with the same rigour. 
1.3 Value pluralism 
In order to better understand this paper’s philosophical 
background, it is useful to spend some time examining the thesis of 
value pluralism. This thesis is first and foremost a description of the 
nature of value7. It argues that goods worth pursuing do not only 
seem plural in their achieved forms, but that their roots are 
themselves plural and often conflicting. There can be just or good 
reasons to both do and not do something, since self-contradiction is 
a perfectly plausible result of ethics, even when only one person is 
involved. Therefore, a value pluralist, in opposition to a value monist, 
will not try to encompass all desired goods under one supreme 
notion such as equality or freedom. The practical consequence of this 
metaethical thesis is to shift the focus, when one attempts to solve a 
moral or political dilemma, from the discovery of a true or higher 
principle toward the appraisal of the valid claims on both sides of the 
conflict. Of course, value pluralism does not necessarily imply that 
the validity of moral claims is impossible to assess or is purely 
subjective, nor does it mean that there can be no qualitative 
differences between multiple goods. For example, we may be justified 
to assign less importance to efficiency than to freedom of speech, 
even though we still value both. The main point made by value 
pluralists is that we would make a wrong assumption in thinking that 
most ethical debates can be solved easily by discovering which side is 
right in pointing out the only valid principle to which other reasons 
must yield. 
Of course, not all difficult decisions stem from value pluralism. 
For example, two groups valuing the same territory can enter in 
conflict to take it over. If they both make the same claim (for 
______________ 
7 See Berlin, I. (1969), Four Essays on Liberty ; Nagel, T. (1979), “The 
Fragmentation of Value” ; Galston, W. (2002), Liberal Pluralism and Galston, 
W. (2005), The Practice of Liberal Pluralism. In an earlier form, see Weber, M. 
(2004), The Vocation Lectures : Science As a Vocation, Politics As a Vocation. 
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example that it is their holy land), it can be extremely difficult to 
decide in favour of one of them, even though only one philosophical 
principle of ownership is at stake. In such a case, some external facts 
of the world such as limited resources and lands are responsible for 
the difficulty, despite unanimous agreement over what is important 
and how one can claim it. However, the thesis of value pluralism 
hints at a much deeper internal difficulty, which involves fundamental 
disagreements on the very question of what is to be valued the most. 
This idea of multiple, conflicting yet often equally important 
values is illuminating in the case of neutrality, as it reinforces its status 
as a mean toward complex goods which sometimes require amending 
the scope and application of neutrality itself. If we do not accept any 
form of pluralism, we are likely to think either that neutrality 
necessarily is (or produces) the supreme value to which every other 
concerns must yield, or that it is a completely erroneous conception. 
This can be shown to be very problematic, for example when it 
comes to the institution of public education. If neutrality is supreme, 
there can hardly be a satisfactory public education, as fundamentalists 
of all kinds can point out the unequal burden imposed to them by the 
transmission of basic principles like toleration of differences, equality 
of all humans or the primacy of science in describing the physical 
world. They would be factually right in their grievance, as it is true 
that these contents impose an unequal burden on those whose deep 
beliefs point toward a different thought system. But neutrality is not 
meant to be the sole and absolute criterion in a just education. The 
aforementioned principles taught in our schools all participate from 
values we recognize as important enough to justify a rupture with 
strict or absolute neutrality8.  
Some authors have argued that political liberals should refrain 
from endorsing such a thesis as “value pluralism”, since it is a 
“comprehensive” doctrine, one that causes unnecessary divisions 
outside of the goals of policy-making9. As such, we should limit 
______________ 
8 On the tension between religious fundamentalism and political liberal 
neutrality, on matters of education, see Macedo, S. (1995), “Liberal Civic 
Education and Religious Fundamentalism : The Case of God v. John 
Rawls?”. 
9 See the arguments made using Rawls’s work and his own in Larmore, C. 
(2008), The Autonomy of Morality.  
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ourselves to the simple observation that a reasonable pluralism exists, 
without attempting to explain its existence with a theory about the 
nature of value itself. I, for one, find myself endorsing strongly both 
the theses of political liberalism and value pluralism. In order to be 
coherent, in this paper, I propose that admitting value pluralism is, to 
my knowledge, the best way to make sense of how we operate when 
it comes to the principle of neutrality, although it is still possible for 
others to reconcile the four stages of liberal neutrality with their own 
monist or non-conflicting conception of value10. 
In the end, there are good reasons to believe that the exaggerated 
focus on a perfect definition of the principle of neutrality and the 
dissatisfaction with its current definitions both come from an 
expectation that opposes the thesis of value pluralism. Indeed, most 
difficulties seem to stem from the idea that such a principle, if 
correctly formulated, could and should encompass all desired goods 
in all contexts, without ever entering in conflict with other recognized 
principles about how to orchestrate collective actions in a just 
manner. On the contrary, once one accepts, in line with value 
pluralism, that a principle such as neutrality is rather meant to help us 
in the difficult process of deciding between valid – but in some cases 
conflicting – values, one can better accept the tensions and limits 
found in our formulation of the principle of liberal neutrality.  
2. Two classical stages 
2.1 Stage 1 – If it’s bad, it’s bad 
As promised, this paper will now put aside the abstract debate 
over the principle of neutrality in order to show how it can be used to 
shape liberal policies and institutions in a contemporary democratic 
state aiming for justice. In doing so, I hope to lay to rest some of the 
concerns about this notion by showing that it really possesses the 
______________ 
10 Of course, there are some liberals who simply reject the thesis of political 
liberalism and therefore have no problem arguing for value pluralism as the 
best explanation for our moral world. See the discussion in  Galston, W. and 
al. (2006), “A propos de ‘The Practice of Liberal Pluralism’ de William 
Galston, un dialogue avec l’auteur”. 
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potential to say something meaningful in debates about our public 
policies. 
The first stage proposed is inspired by a 1985 decision by the 
Supreme Court of Canada concerning the Lord’s Day Act. At the time, 
the existing law forbade the opening of a business on Sunday. A case 
was brought to the Supreme Court when a business found guilty 
under the law contested its legitimacy. The Court stipulated that, 
before there can be any discussion on the effects of the law, it had to 
pass an initial test : 
The initial test of constitutionality must be whether or not 
the legislation's purpose is valid ; the legislation’s effects 
need only be considered when the law under review has 
passed the purpose test. The effects test can never be 
relied on to save legislation with an invalid purpose11. 
The Court was well aware that many reasons can be given in 
favour of a mandatory closing day. For example, the desire to secure 
some relief for the workforce could at least be taken seriously as a 
cause for a breach of freedom. But in the case of the Lord’s Day Act, 
the relevant purpose was to guarantee the observance of Christianity, 
which is an unacceptable infringement of neutrality :  
The Lord’s Day Act cannot be found to have a secular 
purpose on the basis of changed social conditions. 
Legislative purpose is the function of the intent of those 
who draft and then enact the legislation at the time and not 
of any shifting variable12. 
Therefore, according to the Court, the only outcome possible was 
to acquit the defendant and eliminate the law altogether. 
This ruling is important, because it hints to the argument 
presented in this paper. First, a rule must have a legitimate purpose - 
something a law made only to bolster the majority’s conception of a 
good life does not have. If the intent is unacceptable, there is not 
______________ 
11 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
12 Ibid. 
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even need to prove that it is discriminatory to some conceptions of a 
good life. Hence the section title : “If it’s bad, it’s bad”. 
It is worth explaining that this rejection of an illegitimate purpose 
does not happen according to an undisclosed a priori conception of 
what is legitimate and illegitimate. Indeed, it should rather be 
interpreted as something like Rawls’s considered judgments13. These 
judgements have no ontological or epistemological priority, but they 
allow us to progress in a moral inquiry. In the case of bolstering the 
majority’s religion, we can rely on the experience of the religious wars 
between Catholics and Protestants to reasonably justify a rejection. 
But of course, without such a repeated experience of tragic outcomes, 
doubts could remain and we could find ourselves without sufficient 
“provisional fixed points” to state that the purpose is illegitimate. 
Therefore, the idea of a legitimate intent has to be understood in a 
limited way : is there, at this time, reasonable jurisprudence or public 
recognition to establish that a given purpose is invalid? If there is, the 
first stage can settle things. If there is not, as in most cases, then 
other stages intervene. 
As we will soon see, the problem posed in the first stage is the 
only one that can be solved by focusing solely on the intent of a 
norm or practice. In our common sense, we often think and act 
according to the idea that behind any bad result, there is a culprit, a 
mastermind who intended it precisely that way. Unfortunately, this 
line of reasoning is detrimental to the correct understanding of the 
principle of neutrality, as the majority of its infringements are 
unwanted results of norms intended for something worthwhile. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada, following what they 
believed was at the core of the country’s public values, did not limit 
itself to such a neutrality of intention, although it has been sufficient 
in this particular ruling, and went on to develop other tests aimed at 
tackling cases where something like the neutrality of effects was 
involved.  
 
 
 
______________ 
13 A central concept in Rawls, J. (1993), Political Liberalism. The John Dewey 
Essays in Philosophy. 
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2.2 Stage 2 – Deciding with ingenuity and proportionality 
As we have seen so far, it is unthinkable for a norm to be 
absolutely neutral regarding every single life choice. Furthermore, the 
majority of collective norms and practices hold some merit, since we 
choose to enact or prolong them to pursue a valid goal, even at the 
price of creating an unequal burden on some individuals. Of course, 
some distinctions can help us choose between reasonable and 
unreasonable life choices, as in Rawls’s political liberalism, thus 
allowing us not to care so much about infringements of criminal or 
racist life choices14. But even after taking that step, it still feels like we 
should not always rest on the mere fact that a valid goal was pursued 
when there is an overwhelming restriction on one’s capacity to follow 
his reasonable life choices. After all, we started caring about neutrality 
as a mean to transform our society toward, amongst other things, a 
greater capacity for everyone to follow their own path. The question 
is therefore : how could we appraise conflicting values and come to a 
decision when there is both a relevant intent (often a collective goal 
worth pursuing) and an important burden on some individuals (often 
an inability to follow one’s religious or non-religious beliefs)? In 
R. v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that collective 
goals can limit even the rights and freedoms at the core of most 
liberal Constitutions : 
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are 
not, however, absolute. It may become necessary to limit 
rights and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise 
would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of 
fundamental importance15. 
Having said that, the Court went on to devise the “Oakes test”, 
which enjoyed a wide popularity in subsequent rulings, even outside 
of Canada, and inspired the second stage of liberal neutrality 
assessment presented in this paper. 
______________ 
14 Rawls, J. (1993), Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy. 
15 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. Interestingly enough, this case was not 
about freedom of religion or the neutrality of the state, but rather about 
possession of illicit drugs and the presumption of innocence. 
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The Oakes test starts after a positive answer is given to the 
question of the legitimate intent of a law, as exposed in R. v. Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd., and focuses on assessing its proportionality. This is 
mostly done in three steps. First, the means employed must be 
rationally connected to the objective that was found to be legitimate. 
Although it sounds like a truism, in our societies, there are a number 
of norms that appeal to a valid objective but nevertheless impose 
burdens that serve that objective in no way16. Second, there must be 
as little infringements of rights as reasonably possible. This allows the 
examining of other alternatives in order to find if the same objective 
could be reached while creating a lesser burden. Third, the 
infringement must be proportional to the objective, for, even in the 
absence of better alternatives, abstention can be a sound choice if 
pursuing a minimally important objective involves the creation of a 
massive burden. 
This test is interesting as it gives a well-constructed prototype 
intended to treat hard cases in which we feel there are conflicting yet 
legitimate values on both side. We may wish to add more steps to the 
test in order to use it in the wider context of neutrality, instead of 
confining ourselves to the context of constitutional rights, but the 
intent stays the same : showing ingenuity when making a decision is 
hard. 
In opposition to the simplicity and ease of the first stage, this 
second stage is both complex and tragic. I say tragic because the 
losing side of a decision nevertheless brought legitimate arguments. 
In the hardest cases, extremely important values like equality can end 
up on the losing side of a decision. As I said earlier, the 
acknowledgement that there can be a tragic loss in a sound moral 
decision is at the heart of value pluralism17. A recurrent critique I 
received, when I started working on the idea of taking into account 
the consequences of value pluralism in our understanding of 
______________ 
16 A famous case in which this was found to matter was R. v. Morgentaler, 
[1988] 1 R.C.S. 30, in which a law against the practice of abortions was 
found to present a legitimate intent, protecting the foetus and the woman’s 
health, but an irrational connection between that intent and its means. 
17 At least in Isaiah Berlin’s work, as some authors do not believe that value 
pluralism involves conflicts and tragedies, but only a harmonious 
fragmentation. 
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neutrality was that, in doing so, I retreated from the true nature of 
moral reasoning18. For many philosophers, there has to be underlying 
principles to decide what we ought to do, or else we cannot make a 
moral decision. In their eyes, value pluralists just retreat too early in 
their task of identifying what value should rightfully and consistently 
win over others. For example, freedom of speech should come 
before public order in all cases or in no case at all. Nothing else is 
acceptable as a moral decision (although it could go differently in a 
legal or political decision). In that view, it simply cannot be that 
freedom of speech could be deemed morally more important up to a 
certain point but not after.  
If there was such a durable order governing values, then the tragic 
dimension of morality would be alleviated, for conflicts of values 
would be objectively resolved and we would not dirty our hands in 
decision-making. However, sadly, nothing in the experience of moral 
conflicts, from the day to day life to the higher questionings, seems to 
corroborate this idea that value pluralism could be satisfactorily 
dissolved in an objective and durable list of priorities. We may try and 
build general guidelines of priorities, such as Rawls’s lexical priority 
of the first principle over the second, but it is only a temporary 
beacon. It is possible that, in a given situation, sticking to that priority 
becomes impossible in regard to our moral reasoning. Therefore, in 
this paper, I propose to recognize the limitations of this method of 
seeking universal orders of values and to work, instead, on a line of 
reasoning that can help us move forward even in the absence of clear 
priorities. 
______________ 
18 This argument was presented to me by Philippe Van Parijs over an earlier 
version of this paper. His argument was that there had to be simple 
principles to resolves the so-called “hard cases”, which simply couldn’t be 
“hard” in this sense. We can be corrupted or unwilling to act, but we cannot 
find ourselves without uniform principles to apply, if we think things 
through. For example, we had to be missing something like a constant 
priority of safety over religious belief in the Multani ruling (studied in the last 
section of this paper), rather than having to weight each against the other. 
Van Parijs summarized his point as follows : although applying morality can 
be complex and difficult in some cases, morality itself is simple. On the 
contrary, I argue that both morality itself and its application are inextricably 
complex and conflicting. 
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Although I present the thesis of value pluralism as the best 
explanation and horizon of our real-life normative inquiries, and 
although I draw my inspiration from rulings of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, it does not mean that legal thinkers and law practitioners, in 
opposition to philosophers, accept it. In fact, more often than not, 
the more a court’s decision relied on such an admission of a hard case 
with equally strong arguments on both sides, the more it is disliked. 
Many in that field also believe that a correct decision – if not in 
politics, then at least in law – is one founded on one clean principle 
or right that should transcend the others in all contexts. But if there is 
a number of conflicting yet equally important values put into 
proportion, then they also understand that the result is somehow 
tragic and uneasy. In a way, there is no point in blaming readers for 
feeling discomfort with this second stage, since discomfort was 
present from its very inception. But, perhaps because the duty of a 
supreme court is to decide absolutely, whereas philosophers and 
politicians can refuse to settle, the Court was at least able to alleviate 
some of our discomfort in hard cases by bringing, in the form of legal 
reasoning and tests, as much guidance as possible in order to come to 
a better decision.  
Finally, in spite of the fact that the proportionality test is a recent 
Canadian invention, it is still relevant to think of this second stage as 
an important part of the general application of liberal neutrality 
everywhere, since liberals have always been through a somewhat 
similar reasoning – if not in abstract matters, at least in real-life 
decisions – to weight the creation of general goods against the 
emergence of unequal burdens on individuals. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has devised a really concise and helpful test, but for better or 
worse, we have always found and will always find ways to evaluate 
such public dilemmas. It is the reason why, even though there are 
always disagreements over which results to reach in a particular case, 
it is safe to say that this stage is – at least unconsciously – widely 
accepted in practice. The next two stages brought forward in this 
paper, on the contrary, are more debated, as a number of authors and 
political actors are not only challenging their philosophical 
justifications, but also their very implementation. 
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3. Two recent and contentious stages 
3.1 Stage 3 - Reverse discrimination as a compensation 
The third stage starts after the second stage has settled that a non-
neutral norm or practice should nevertheless be kept, given its 
relevant and proportional effects. Although we are often satisfied 
with this conclusion, there are some cases in which our “moral sense” 
is still tingling. Fortunately, the evolution of liberalism and social 
policies in the 20th century has brought new recourses in order to 
come closer to neutrality and its goals, instead of simply giving up on 
our feelings of injustice at this point. 
The first example of these recourses would be positive 
discrimination. In Western societies, there is a complex history and, 
sometimes, a deeply-embedded web of implicit norms that bolster 
discrimination in wages and opportunities for a group. In North 
America, this has been found to be especially the case for women, 
African Americans and Native Americans19. Of course, the first two 
stages of liberal neutrality can help us identify and remove many of 
these sources of discrimination. But, at the end of the day, it is 
impossible for us to eliminate them all, as it would be 
disproportionate to control every actions, preferences and criteria 
present in the general population that might be detrimental to these 
groups. Yet, by renouncing to act, we infringe on neutrality by leaving 
the members of these groups with an unequal capacity to follow 
one’s conception of a good life. Positive discrimination is a remedy 
for such a situation as it brings the compromise of compensating for 
an unequal burden created at a reasonably untouchable level with an 
______________ 
19 In Canada, the presence of the Québécois nation adds another level of 
diversity with its own history of abuses. But the question of stateless nations 
or multinational states largely falls outside the notion of neutrality, even 
given the wide spectrum of analysis adopted in this article. Indeed, nothing 
in this notion can allow us to trace the frontiers or determinate the relations 
between political communities. Although this four stages method could help 
identify and remove discriminations faced by a national minority, the 
demands for the minority’s assymetry, autonomy or independance cannot be 
put forward or refuted with this notion. Indeed, such national claims may 
still be relevant without any discrimination. 
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advantage at another, in order for the two to cancel each other and 
for neutrality to be maintained. This conception of equality has been 
disputed by many people who simply cannot accept that this concept 
may involve differentiated treatment in terms of employments, 
opportunities or direct compensations such as scholarships. 
However, most of us have come to understand that, as surprising as 
it sounds, it is nonetheless the correct extension of the underlying 
goals of neutrality. In the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it is 
thus explicitly stated that equality before and under the law does not 
preclude : 
[…] any law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability20. 
This idea of a compensation for an unequally shared burden 
created by norms, institutions and practices we cannot or would not 
change can also be mobilized outside the matters of historical 
minorities to give a justification for the idea of redistributing wealth 
in a liberal society21. Although it is limited in all sorts of ways, the 
market economy is still a major institution in a liberal society. One 
can argue that there would be many reasons to keep this institution 
through the tests of the first two stages of liberal neutrality, given its 
relative efficiency in bringing together the preferences of the 
consumers and those of the producers, as well as its close relationship 
with values of freedom and equal chances. Nevertheless, a market 
economy creates an environment in which the real capacity to pursue 
one’s conception of a good life is greatly and unequally impaired22.  
______________ 
20 “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”, Constitution Act (1982). 
Section 15, subsection 2. 
21 This justification is but one of the many available and might only justify a 
minimal redistribution. But it is worth mentioning, if only to break the 
artificial wall between matters of neutrality and identity on one hand and 
matters of economics and redistribution of wealth on the other.  
22 Because of the differences in upbringing and concrete opportunity, this 
stays true even if one accepts that effort should indeed be a determining 
factor in equality and that, as such, we do not have to care about choosing 
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In a similar fashion, but with the poor as the intended group, a 
case can be made for redistribution of wealth or the availability of 
free services and institutions to be collectively – and thus unequally – 
paid for. These measures of social justice can be presented as just 
compensations for the involuntary yet decisively non-neutral 
characteristics of the economical institutions we deem to be the best 
possible at this time.  
3.2 Stage 4 – Reasonable accommodation 
The fourth stage of liberal neutrality assessment is orchestrated 
around the notion of reasonable accommodation, a parallel creation of 
both the US and Canadian Supreme Courts23. Often misrepresented 
in the media as an incoherent product of judicial activism, it is in fact 
a direct consequence of the values of equality and freedom involved 
in the notion of neutrality. Basically, a reasonable accommodation is a 
way to alleviate an intense discrimination by reasonably altering the 
application of a general rule on specific individuals. As such, it is not 
recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada as a caprice or a luxury, 
but rather as a duty inherent to the notion of equality and an implicit 
consequence of the pre-existent laws of non-discrimination24.  
                                                                                                 
norms neutral toward the conceptions of a good life of lazy and 
unproductive individuals. Therefore, this view does not entail the adoption 
of such theories as “real libertarianism”, nor does it refutes them. On the 
question of the factors determinative of equality, see, amongst many, Van 
Parijs, P. (1998), Real Freedom for All : What (if anything) can justify capitalism and 
Heath, J. (2006), “On the Scope of Egalitarian Justice”.   
23 But, in the US, the definition of what constitutes an unreasonable burden in a 
given accommodation is such that even the slightest financial cost tends to 
trigger it. Thus, the American creation is less promising regarding its 
underlying goal of fighting discrimination and restoring equality. 
24 For the whole history and logic of this concept in Canadian law, see 
Bosset, P. (2007), “Les fondements juridiques et l’évolution de l’obligation 
d’accommodement raisonnable”, p. 4. Since they are deeply rooted in the 
value of equality, it would be erroneous to portray reasonable 
accomodations as a tacit acceptance of “multiculturalism”, especially when 
that term connotes the conflict between the Canadian and the Québécois 
models of integration. Indeed, cases dealing with handicaps call for 
reasonable accomodations without being related to discussions on the place 
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A famous case of reasonable accommodation, popularised as the 
“Multani affair”, involved a Sikh student who was denied the right 
the wear the kirpan at school. The kirpan being a knife, the governing 
board of the school refused to ratify the accommodation practice that 
was agreed upon on prior occasions. The previous compromise was 
that, in order for one to wear a kirpan at school, as dictated by his 
faith, the knife would have to be sealed inside an inoffensive 
container and made inaccessible to other students. There has been no 
case of assaults involving a kirpan in Canada, but it is still reasonable 
for a school to protect students from even a small possibility of harm. 
But the freedom of consciousness of the young Sikhs mattered too. 
The accommodation practice agreed upon in that case was able to 
reconcile both intents just by making a small exception and, 
therefore, the Supreme Court forced the hand of the school in 
ratifying it25. Since then, it is still possible for a school to forbid 
knives at school, for it is a legitimate general rule. A school can even 
forbid a kirpan that is not properly handled, since safety matters. But 
it cannot refuse to compromise over a kirpan rendered reasonably 
inoffensive. Again, this ruling proves that reasonable accommodation 
is an obligation for which the limits are not our generosity or our 
approbation of the belief in question, but rather the reasonableness 
of its consequences in attempting to restore equality. If a kirpan could 
not be rendered reasonably inoffensive, the accommodation would 
arguably not have been reasonable. Even through the practice of 
reasonable accommodation, our commitment to neutrality and its 
underlying values must still face the limits of other equally important 
values such as public safety. 
Another ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada worth 
mentioning as an inspiration for the crafting of this paper’s four 
stages and their interrelations is British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights)26. This ruling over 
                                                                                                 
of diversity and inclusion of migrants. Obviously, both notions are attuned 
to contemporary liberal understandings, but still, one does not entail the 
other.  
25 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 
256, 2006 SCC 6. 
26 British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia 
(Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868. 
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a discrimination pertaining not to a belief but rather to a physical 
disability established that reasonable accommodation is not meant as 
a clever tool to keep in place an openly discriminatory norm, one that 
would otherwise fail the tests of the first two stages, following the 
reasoning that these are useless now that accommodation practices 
are available. On the contrary, the possibility of accommodation is 
but an addition to the wider project of reducing the unnecessary and 
unequal burdens put on members of our society. In this wider 
project, reasonable accommodation was intended for use only when a 
legitimate rule has intense and specific effect on one or a small 
number of unique individuals. Therefore, a recurrent critique 
according to which the notion of reasonable accomodation causes a 
loss in equality should be put to rest. We will not stop caring about 
fighting wide discrimination and laws with illegitimate intent, in order 
to focus all our efforts on multiplying individual, limited and 
sometimes inappropriate accommodations in every case27. This is 
probably the kind of errors the Court had in mind when they 
reaffirmed, prior to the duty of accommodation, the need for such 
inquiries as those exposed in the first two stages of this paper. 
The last remark on the articulation of the fourth stage with the 
first two brings us to the realization that there are also crucial 
differences between the third and fourth stages of liberal neutrality. 
These differences justify using the stages successively. Indeed, if the 
practice of positive discrimination took us away from a rigid 
conception of equality as identical treatment, the subjects of a 
differentiated treatment were still defined as an objective group often 
suffering from statistically quantifiable discriminations. Many have 
thus come to accept that women, aboriginal people, visible 
minorities, people with disabilities and, through different methods, 
the poor should somehow be compensated for the historic or 
systemic discriminations that we are not able to eliminate and that 
continue to this day to bring a difference in term of opportunities to 
follow one’s conception of a good life. But a practice such as 
reasonable accommodation operates very differently by interfering 
______________ 
27 For similar reasons, I doubt the relevance of an opposition between 
multicultural justice and redistributive justice. As if one was to replace the 
other and we had to choose wisely which it will be! See for example Barry, 
B. (2000), Culture and Equality : An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. 
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with the application of the law on a very subjective basis. Indeed, 
other individuals within the same group (or those treated in the same 
way by a norm or practice) will not be the subjects of a given 
accommodation if they are not suffering from the norm or practice in 
the same intensity. The possibility for an observer of the Sabbath to 
be given some flexibility around his day of rest in a big corporation 
does not extend to everyone for a day of their choice28. Neither does 
it extend to non-practicing members of the same religious 
denomination or community. This is because the focus of the fourth 
stage is no longer to compensate individuals as a group but only the 
specific few who are intensively affected by a norm deemed 
reasonably inoffensive to the rest of the group. Here, the 
discrimination happens because it clashes with individual 
characteristics, from a specific handicap to a deeply-rooted belief, in 
absence of which neutrality would have been preserved. 
But the scope is not the only difference between the third and 
fourth stages, since the corrective measures of positive discrimination 
and redistribution are generally not appropriate tools to restore 
equality at the fourth stage. Indeed, in the case of a diabetic child 
facing the general and very sound interdiction of bringing needles to 
school, it is clear that the problem cannot be solved by compensating 
him elsewhere with scholarships or alleviated criteria for admission. If 
such a situation bothers us, and it should, there is no roundabout way 
to go : the rule itself must be amended somehow. The same is true in 
the case of Sikh policemen whose uniforms prevented the wearing of 
the turban. No monetary compensation or promotions could serve as 
a functional equivalent to a compromise over the uniform itself. 
Although some authors have tried to establish a difference between 
handicaps and deep convictions, we must realize that this is a trait 
shared in most if not all demands for reasonable accommodation. It 
may seem to us that, while someone suffering from a medical 
condition has no choice, monetary compensations or opportunities – 
if we are willing to give any – should be plenty to compensate a 
religious individual for having to renounce the opportunity to follow 
his convictions, or a vegetarian for bringing himself to eat meat. But 
it is only because we do not share equally deep convictions on these 
______________ 
28 As made explicit in the ruling Ontario Human Rights Commission. v. 
Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536. 
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matters that we believe that they are subject to trade-offs as are any 
ordinary tastes or preferences.  
But a truly deep conviction about what constitutes a good life is 
not a simple preference, although some actions involved in following 
it will be. The difficulty is that it is very hard to know from the 
outside which acts are truly part of a conception of a good life and 
which can be reasonably disregarded in term of neutrality. In fact, the 
ruling made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem wisely established that the relevant criterion to identify a 
deep conviction worth protecting is the sincere belief. In this 
particular case, there was much discussion over the fact that, 
although the defendants argued that they sincerely believed they had 
a religious duty to practice a Jewish ritual in their own succah, the 
relevant doctrine of Judaism might have been satisfied with a 
collective succah, a difference that mattered in this civil lawsuit. But 
since what is at stake is the capacity of an individual to follow his 
own conception of a good life, and not in any way the protection of 
religious orthodoxy in itself, the Court was right to establish that only 
the sincere belief mattered : 
[…] the Quebec (and the Canadian) Charter does not 
require a person to prove that his or her religious practices 
are supported by any mandatory doctrine of faith. 
Furthermore, any incorporation of distinctions between 
“obligation” and “custom” or, as made by the respondent 
and the courts below, between “objective obligation” and 
“subjective obligation or belief” within the framework of a 
religious freedom analysis is dubious, unwarranted and 
unduly restrictive. On the issue of sincerity, the trial judge 
correctly concluded that the appellant A sincerely believed 
that he was obliged to set up a succah on his own 
property29. 
______________ 
29 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551. Of course, the fact 
that the relevant criterion to begin examining such an accommodation 
request is the sincerity of belief does not imply that any sincere belief will be 
accommodated. As always, a request has to be legitimate and reasonable in 
its application. 
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4. Conclusion 
A political community is not neutral, neither are most of its 
institutions, norms and practices. This is a fact. However, the notion 
of neutrality found at the core of liberalism is still useful as a mean to 
inspect and alter these institutions, norms and practices in line with 
ideals such as the free and equal capacity to follow one’s conception 
of a good life, given the fundamental conflict of values involved. By 
going through the four stages I presented, there are good reasons to 
believe that we can approach definite solutions in hard cases and 
come closer to these goals than by following the guidance of any 
abstract, absolute and one-sided definition of neutrality.  
When faced with a norm that creates unequally shared burdens on 
members of our society, we shall first ask if the intention of that 
norm is legitimate. If it is, we shall move on to appraise the 
proportionality of that intention with its effects. If we are to rule that 
it is balanced and preferable to its alternative, we shall nevertheless 
try to compensate those who are the victims of its effects at another 
level. Finally, if the norm went through the first two stages and then 
was not or could not be compensated satisfactorily at the third, we 
shall try our best to create a very specific exception to its application 
in order to offer a reasonable accommodation for the few individuals 
disproportionately affected by it. 
By putting forward some version of this four stages process, with 
changes pertaining to the different public cultures and values, I 
believe that liberals in most contemporary societies can make a 
stronger and much more attractive case for the principle of neutrality 
as an important factor in the founding and constant re-evaluation of a 
society aiming toward justice.  
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